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Abstract. Braid group is a very important non-commutative group. It
is also an important tool of quantum field theory, and has good topolog-
ical properties. This paper focuses on the provable security research of
cryptosystem over braid group, which consists of two aspects: One, we
prove that the Ko’s cryptosystem based on braid group is secure against
chosen-plaintext-attack(CPA) which proposed in CRYPTO 2000, while
it dose not resist active attack. The other is to propose a new pub-
lic key cryptosystem over braid group which is secure against adaptive
chosen-ciphertext-attack(CCA2 ). Our proofs are based on random or-
acle models, under the computational conjugacy search assumption(the
CCS assumption). This kind of results have never been seen before.
Keywords: Braid group, Public key cryptosystem, IND-CPA, IND-CCA2,
Conjugacy, non-commutative group
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and related work
In 1994, Shor[2] proposed a quantum fourier transforma algorithm, which can
construct an integer factorization polynomial (quantum) algorithm, which poses
a substantial threat to the security of RSA. In 2003, Proos et al. [3] extended the
Shor algorithm to the elliptic curve, and obtained the polynomial (quantum) al-
gorithm for solving the discrete logarithm problem over the elliptic curve, which
poses a substantial threat to the security of ECC. However, these famous quan-
tum algorithms mainly focus on the exchange structure. For some Cryptosys-
tems based on noncommutative structures[1][4][7][8],that attacks are ineffective.
Therefore, the design of cryptographic systems over certain non-commutative
groups is one of the most important way to find algorithms which can resist
quantum attacks. It is the key research object in the field of post quantum
cryptography.
The braid group is a very important infinite non-commutative generation
group. Because of its many difficult problems and many commutative subgroups,
that make it can be used as the carrier of the design of cryptographic systems.
The braid group has good algebraic properties, making it a good platform for
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designing quantum attack algorithms. In 2000, Ko et al proposed a public key
cryptosystem based on braid group, after that, there are many papers about the
design of the braid cryptosystem in [9][11][12], followed by some questions about
the hypothesis of the braid base problem [11][13][14][15][16] were proposed. How-
ever, as far as the existing technology and theory are concerned, the conjugate
problem on the braid group is still difficult[18][19], that is, there is no polynomial
algorithm that can solve the conjugate problem on the braid group in polyno-
mial time, and even in quantum computation, there is no effective algorithm for
the conjugate problem at present.
After many years of research and development, people have a deeper under-
standing of braid cryptology, especially the starting point of the braid group,
which greatly promotes the research of cryptographic systems on noncommuta-
tive group[36][37][38]. On the other hand, there are some fast computation algo-
rithms were proposed[28][32][22][31], and the implementation of this algorithm
has been solved by the center of steven research on algebraic[39]. Recently, there
are some digital signature algorithms were proposed, such asWalnutDSA[5][6][10],
and others schemes was proposed[20][21]. These scheme are very attractive. The
performance of computing and storage is approaching the need of application.
But so far, the research on the proof security of braid cryptosystems is very
rare or even empty, which greatly hinders the delovepment and application of
braid cryptosystem. The security of IND-CPA, IND-CCA and IND-CCA2 is en-
hanced in turn [23] [24] [25], and the structure of cipher algorithm is becoming
more and more complex, and the consumption of computation is also increasing.
The early construction of CCA or CCA2 security is realized by the zero knowl-
edge proof method, so the cryptographic algorithm constructed is very practical.
In 1993, Bellare and Rogaway[26] proposed a method to prove IND-CCA2 un-
der the random oracle model. The model is concise and is widely recognized and
loved by the researchers. Although the security conclusion of the cryptographic
algorithm in this model does not fully represent the actual security[26], it is still
the most effective index of security. The ROM model and method are still the
main technology of the public key cryptographic security argument. The public
key cryptography algorithm based on braid group also uses ROM model to prove
security.
1.2 Our result
There are more detailed studies on the definition, basic concepts and compu-
tational methods of the braid group[27], this article will not be described here.
But the main section is focused on the proof of security of the braid group
cryptography algorithm. Our main work is as follows:
1.We have finished the research on the indistinguishability of the braid cryp-
tosystem proposed by Ko[1], proved that it is IND-CPA through the random
oracle model under the computational conjugacy search assumption(the CCS
assumption), and we emphasize that it does not have the ability to resist active
attack.
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2. According to the original EIGamal scheme design idea, we propose a cryp-
tographic algorithm with IND-CPA security under the standard model and the
decisional conjugacy search assumpiton(the DCS assumption).
3. Adopting the design idea of hybrid encryption system, we propose a new
public key cryptosystem in braid against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. Sub-
sequently, its IND-CCA2 security is proved under the random oracle model.
Before this paper, there is no any research on the provable secure encryption
algorithm on braid group, Our algorithm and proof fill this gap. Like all the
provable security analysis procedures, the proof part of this article has taken a
lot of space, but its logical process is not very complicated.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Braid Group
Compared with the general group, the structure of the braid group is more
special and complicated. Although the introduction of braid group theory has
been very detailed, we still need to spend some words to introduce the basic
theories related to it. If the readers need more about braid theory, please refer
to literature[27]
Definition 1 Define Bn as a braid group generated by σ1, σ2, · · · , σn−1, and
following the relations:
{
σiσjσi = σjσiσj if |i− j| = 1
σiσj = σjσi if |i− j| ≥ 2
The string formed by generators in braid group Bn is called a braid (or a
word), and the number of generators in the string is the length of the braid (or
word). It can be clearly seen that the braid group is a class of non commutative
generating groups, but there are a large number of commutative elements on
it. It is easy to see that there are many commutative subgroups on it. Assume
Bl+r = {σ1, σ2, · · · , σl+r−1}, let LBl = {σ1, σ2, · · · , σr−1} be a left subgroup,
and RBr = {σr+1, σr+2, σr+l−1} be a right subgroup. So
∀x ∈ LBl, ∀y ∈ RBr, xy = yx
This is the basis for computing for building an available key exchange protocol
and a cryptographic algorithm.
Definition 2 The fundamental braid is represented by the symbol ∆:
{
∆ = 1
∆n = ∆n−1σn−1σn−2 · · ·σ1
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Theorem 1 [28] Every word w in braid can be represented as a canonical form:
W = ∆kA, k ∈ Z,A ∈ B+n , or the canonical form for short. Of course, there are
many standard forms of it. Please refer to the literature[29][30][32][33]. For the
sake of convenience, this paper adopts the left canonical form.
The literature[1] enumerated 7 hard problems in the braid group, we show
that problems related to this paper as follow:
1. Conjugacy Decision Problem
Instance: (x, y) ∈ Bn ×Bn.
Objuctive: Determine whether x and y are conjugate or not.
2. Conjugacy Search Problem
Instance: (x, y) ∈ Bn ×Bn such that x and y are conjugate.
Objuctive: Find a ∈ Bn such that y = axa
−1.
3. Generalized Conjugacy Search Problem
Instance: (x, y) ∈ Bn ×Bn such that y = axa
−1 for some b ∈ Bm, m ≤ n.
Objuctive: Find a ∈ Bm such that y = axa
−1.
These hard problems are very useful for the analysis of public key cryptosys-
tems,thus, we will use them to construct the security assumption.
2.2 Security Model
The security model is portrayed by Indistinguishability-Game (IND-GAME),
mainly divided into three levels: Indistinguishability-Chosen Plaintext Attack
(IND-CPA) [23], Indistinguishability - (Non Adaptive) Chosen Ciphertext At-
tack (IND-CCA) [24], Indistinguishability - (Adaptive) Chosen Ciphertext At-
tack (IND-CCA2) [25].
Definition 3 Indistinguishability-Chosen Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA)
The IND game of public key encryption scheme under chosen plaintext attack
(IND-CPA) is as follows[23]:
Step1. Initialization The Challenger B generates the password system, and
the Adversary A obtains the system public key pk.
Step2. The Adversary A generates plaintext messages and obtains encrypted
ciphertext (polynomial bounded).
Step3. Challenge. The Adversary A outputs two messages of the same length,
M0 and M1. The Challenger B chooses β ←R {0, 1}, cipher Mβ, and sends
ciphertext C∗ (Target ciphertext) to A.
Step4. Guess. A outputs β′, if β′ = β, return 1, A attack successfully.
The advantage of the adversary A can be defined as a function of the param-
eter K:
AdvCPAA (K) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[β′ = β]− 12
∣∣∣∣
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For a polynomial time adversary A, there is a negligible function ε(K) that
makes AdvCPAA (K) ≤ ε(K) set up, it is called IND-CPA security.
Definition 4 Indistinguishability - (Non Adaptive) Chosen Ciphertext
Attack (IND-CCA) [24] The IND game of public key encryption scheme un-
der chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) is as follows[24]
Step1. Initialization The Challenger B generates the password system, and
the Adversary A obtains the system public key pk.
Step2. Training. A sends the ciphertext C to the B, and B sends the de-
crypted plaintext to A.(Polynomial bounded)
Step3. Challenge. The Adversary A outputs two messages of the same length,
M0 and M1. The Challenger B chooses β ←R {0, 1}, cipher Mβ, and sends
ciphertext C∗ (Target ciphertext) to A.
Step4. Guess. A outputs β′, if β′ = β, return 1, A attack successfully.
The advantage of the adversary A can be defined as a function of the param-
eter K:
AdvCCAA (K) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[β′ = β]− 12
∣∣∣∣
For a polynomial time adversary A, there is a negligible function ε(K) that
makes AdvCCAA (K) ≤ ε(K) set up, it is called IND-CCA security.
The above attack is also called ’lunch time attack’. At a ’lunch time’, the
enemy has a black box that can perform the decryption operation, and the black
box can not be used after ’lunch time’.
Definition 5 Indistinguishability - (Adaptive) Chosen Ciphertext At-
tack (IND-CCA2) [25] The IND game of public key encryption scheme under
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) is as follows[25]
Step1. Initialization The Challenger B generates the password system, and
the Adversary A obtains the system public key pk.
Step2. Training1. A sends the ciphertext C to the B, and B sends the de-
crypted plaintext to A.(Polynomial bounded)
Step3. Challenge. The Adversary A outputs two messages of the same length,
M0 and M1. The Challenger B chooses β ←R {0, 1}, cipher Mβ, and send
ciphertext C∗ (Target ciphertext) to A.
Step4. Training2. A sends the ciphertext C(C 6= C∗) to the B, and B sends
the decrypted plaintext to A.(Polynomial bounded)
Step5. Guess. A outputs β′, if β′ = β, return 1, A attack successfully.
The advantage of the adversary A can be defined as a function of the param-
eter K:
AdvCCA2A (K) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[β′ = β]− 12
∣∣∣∣
For a polynomial time adversary A, there is a negligible function ε(K) that
makes AdvCCA2A (K) ≤ ε(K) set up, it is called IND-CCA2 security.
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3 Two Schemes Provably Secure Against Chosen
Plaintext Attack
In order to research on the indistinguishable security of public key algorithms
over the braid group , we first give the following two assumptions:
The Compution Conjugacy Search Assumption (The CCS Assump-
tion) Given X,Y ∈ Bn, X = xgx
−1, Y = ygy−1, it is hard to compute Z =
(xy)g(xy)−1
The Decisional Conjugacy Search Assumption (The DCS Assump-
tion) Assume that Bl+r is a braid group, LBl and RBr are left subgroup and
right subgroup, respectively. Assume g, z ←R Bl+r, x←R LBl, y ←R RBr, The
following two distributions are computationally non - distinguishable:
R = (g, xgx−1, ygy−1, zgz−1) (1)
D = (g, xgx−1, ygy−1, (xy)g(xy)−1) (2)
We can call the distribution R is Random four tuple while the distribution D is
DCS four tuple.
3.1 A Scheme Provably Secure Against Chosen Plaintext Attack
Before analyzing Ko. public key cryptosystem[1], we first propose a non hash-
ing braid group public key cryptosystem, which is very similar to the original
ELGamal Scheme[34].
Algorithm 1 Assume Bl+r is a braid group, left subgroup LBl and right sub-
group RBr.
KeyGeneration One selects a element g ←R Bl+r, x←R LBl, X = xgx
−1, the
public key is (X, g), the private key is (x, g).
Encryption The cipher gets a message m ∈ Bl+r, one selects a element y ←R
RBr, compute Y = ygy
−1, Z = yXy−1, c = Zm. The ciphertext is (Y, c).
Decryption The decipher gets the target ciphertext (Y, c), computes Z =
xY x−1,m = Z−1c.
Theorem 2 If the DCS assumption holds, the algorithm 1 is IND − CPA.
Proof : Assume a PPT adversary A attack algorithm 1, A outputs M0,M1,
the challenger B chooses β ←R {0, 1}, cipher it and sents the ciphertext to A.
A runs an randomization algorithm, outputs the guessing value β. If β′ = β, A
attack successfully, represented by event succ. Note that the advantage of A is
Adv1A =
∣∣∣∣12 − Pr[Succ]
∣∣∣∣
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The following constructs an adversary B, B uses A to attack the DCS assump-
tion. Assume B output the tuple T = (g1, g2, g3, g4), the advatage of B is
Adv1B =
∣∣∣∣12 − Pr[β′ = β]
∣∣∣∣
The structure of the B is shown as follows:
Experiment1B(T ) :
pk = (g1, g2);
(M0,M1)← A(pk), |M0| = |M1| = l(K);
β ←R (0, 1);
C∗ = (g3, g4Mβ);
β′ ← A(pk, C∗);
If β′ = β, return 1;
else return 0.
When return 1, B guesses that the input T is four tuples DCS, else B guesses
that the input T is random four tuples. Let R represent events ’T is the random
four tuples’, D represent events ’T is the DCS four tuples’. Two steps of proof:
1. P r[Exp1B(T ) = 1|R] =
1
2 .
When the ’event R’ happened, g4 is a random element in Bl+r, so it is inde-
pendent of the ciphertext C∗. Thus, A have no any information of β, he can’t
guess β with more than 1/2 probability. When B return 1 if and only if A suc-
cess, so Pr[Exp1B(T ) = 1|R] =
1
2 .
2. P r[Exp1B(T ) = 1|D] = Pr[Succ].
When the ’event D’ happened, g2 = xg1x
−1, g3 = yg1y
−1, g4 = yg2y
−1. So B
return 1 if and only if A success.
Pr[Exp1B(T ) = 1] = Pr[D]Pr[Exp
1
B(T ) = 1|D] + Pr[R]Pr[Exp
1
B(T ) = 1|R]
=
1
2
Pr[Succ] +
1
2
×
1
2
Pr[Exp1B(T ) = 0] = Pr[D]Pr[Exp
1
B(T ) = 0|D] + Pr[R]Pr[Exp
1
B(T ) = 0|R]
=
1
2
(1− Pr[Succ]) +
1
2
×
1
2
so,
∣∣Pr[Exp1B(T ) = 1]− Pr[Exp1B(T ) = 0]∣∣ = ∣∣Pr[Succ]− 12 ∣∣
If A attacks B with the non negligible advantage of ε(K), then B attacks
the DCS assumption with the same advantage.
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3.2 The Security of Ko’s cryptosystem
In the provable security theory of public key cryptography, the weaker the secu-
rity assumption is, the more rigorous the results are. Like the DDH assumption
and the CDH assumption[35], The DCS assumption is more stronger than the
CCS assumption. So a scheme under the CCS assumption is more security. The
following algorithm 2 was proposed by Ko et al. in crypto 2000[1].
Algorithm 2 Assume Bl+r is a braid group, left subgroup LBl and right sub-
group RBr, H ←R {H : Bl+r → {0, 1}
l(k)} is a hash function.
KeyGeneration One selects a element g ←R Bl+r, x←R LBl, X = xgx
−1, the
public key is (X, g), the private key is (x, g).
Encryption The cipher gets a message m ∈ Bl+r, one selects a element y ←R
RBr, computes Y = ygy
−1, Z = yXy−1, c = H(Z)⊕m. The ciphertext is (Y, c).
Decryption The decipher gets the target ciphertext (Y, c), computes Z =
xY x−1,m = H(Z)⊕ c.
Theorem 3 If H is a random oracle and the CCS assumption holds, then the
algorithm 2 is secure against chosen plaintext attack.
Proof : Assume that A is an IND−CPA adversary who attacks algorithm 2,
the advantage of A is Adv2A, B is a adversary who attacks the CCS assumption,
the advantage of B is Adv2B . If A attacks algorithm 2 with the non negligible
advantage of ε(K), it must exist B whom attacks the CCS assumption with the
advantage of Adv2B ≥ 2ε(K) . The IND−CPA game of algorithm 2 is described
as follows:
Exp2A(K) :
g ←R Bl+r, x←R LBl, X = xgx
−1;
pk = (g,X), sk = x;
(M0,M1)← A
H(·)(pk), |M0| = |M1| = l(K);
β ←R (0, 1), y ←R RBr, Y = ygy
−1, Z = yXy−1, C∗ = (Y,H(Z)⊕Mβ);
β′ ← AH(·)(pk, C∗);
If β′ = β, return 1;
else return 0.
The advantage of A can be define as a function of the security parameter K
Adv2A(K) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[Exp2A(K) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
B gets (g,X, cˆ1), cˆ1 is the first component of the target ciphertext. Using
the A attacks algorithm 2 as a subprogram, The following steps are taken to
calculate yˆ, cˆ1 = yˆgyˆ
−1.
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1. One chooses a random string hˆ ←R 0, 1
l(k) as a guessing value for H(Zˆ),
B don’t know the Zˆ, sents pk = (g,X) to A;
2. H queries (Bounded polynomial times): B build the list H list (Initial
empty), element type is (Zˆi, hˆi), A can query H
list any time, B respond as
follows:
• If Zˆ in H list, respond with hˆ in (Zˆ, hˆ).
• If cˆ1 = yˆXyˆ
−1, respond with hˆ , record Zˆ = yˆXyˆ−1, save the (Zˆ, hˆ) into
list.
• Else, choose random string hˆ ←R {0, 1}
l(k), respond with hˆ, record Zˆ =
yˆXyˆ−1, save the (Zˆ, hˆ) into list.
3. Challenge. A outputs two messages M0,M1, B chooses β ←R {0, 1}, sets
cˆ2 = hˆ⊕Mβ , sends (cˆ1, cˆ2) (as ciphertexts) to A;
4. After end of above steps, A outputs β′, B outputs Zˆ = yˆXyˆ−1 which
recorded in step2.
Assume that the event D: In the simulation, H(Zˆ) appears in the list H list.
Assertion 1 B is complete in above simulation process.
proof : It is easy to know:
• In the H inquiry of A, each value is answered by random string. In the real
attacks of A, the value of the function is generated by the random oracle, so the
function value obtained by the A is uniformly distributed;
• For A, hˆ⊕Mβ is a one-time pad system, From the randomness of hˆ, it is
known that hˆ⊕Mβ is random for A.
So, Both of the view of A and its view in real attacks are not distinguishable
in calculation.
Assertion 2 In the simulation attack above, Pr[D] ≥ 2ε
proof Obviously Pr[Exp2A(K) = 1|¬D] =
1
2 ,
∵ Adv2A ≥ ε(K), in the simulation:
Pr[Exp2A(K) = 1] = Pr[¬D]Pr[Exp
2
A(K) = 1|¬D] + Pr[D]Pr[Exp
2
A(K) = 1|D]
≤ Pr[¬D]Pr[Exp2A(K) = 1|¬D] + Pr[D]
=
1
2
Pr[¬D] + Pr[D]
=
1
2
+
1
2
Pr[D]
Pr[Exp2A(K) = 1] ≥ Pr[¬D]Pr[Exp
2
A(K) = 1|¬D]
=
1
2
Pr[¬D]
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=
1
2
−
1
2
Pr[D]
∴
1
2 −
1
2Pr[D] ≤ Pr[Exp
2
A(K) = 1] ≤
1
2 +
1
2Pr[D]
∴ Adv2A(K) =
∣∣Pr[Exp2A(K) = 1]− 12 ∣∣ ≤ 12Pr[D]
∴
1
2Pr[D] ≥ 2Adv
2
A(K) = 2
∣∣Pr[Exp2A(K) = 1]− 12 ∣∣ ≥ 2ε(K)
In summary, if A can take advantage of a non negligible advantage ε(K) to
attack algorithm 2, it must exist B whom take Adv2B ≥ 2ε(K) to attack the
CCS assumption. So the algorithm 2 is secure against IND − CPA.
4 A Public Key Cryptosystem on Braid Provably Secure
Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
Under the current complex network environment, it is entirely possible for the
adversary to achieve active attack. Therefore, it is very important for the study
of an algorithm with IND-CCA2 security. Next, we will propose a cryptographic
algorithm secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack on braid groups.
Algorithm 3 (E,D) is a pair of symmetric key algorithms secure against adap-
tive chosen ciphertext attack, other conditions are the same as Algorithm 1.
KeyGeneration One selects a element g ←R Bl+r, x←R LBl, X = xgx
−1, the
public key is (X, g), the private key is (x, g).
Encryption The cipher gets a message m ∈ Bl+r, one selects a element y ←R
RBr, computes Y = ygy
−1, Z = yXy−1, k = H(Z), c = Ek(m). The ciphertext
is (Y, c).
Decryption The decipher gets the target ciphertext (Y, c), computes Z =
xY x−1, k = H(Z),m = Dk(m).
Theorem 4 If H is a random oracle, and the CCS assumption holds, then the
algorithm 3 is secure against chosen ciphertext attack.
Proof : Suppose an IND-CCA2’s adversary A breaks the algorithm 3 with a not
negligible advantage ε(k), then there must be an adversary B attacks the CCS
assumption with the advantage of Adv3B ≥ 2ε(k).
Assume that A is an IND-CCA2 adversary who attacks algorithm 3, the
advantage of A is Adv3A, B is a adversary who attacks the CCS assumption, the
advantage of B is Adv3B . If A can take advantage of a non negligible advantage
ε(K) to attack algorithm 3, it must exist B whom takes Adv3B ≥ ε(K) to attack
the CCS assumption. The IND-CCA2 game of algorithm 3 is described as follows:
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Exp3A(K) :
g ←R Bl+r, x←R LBl, X = xgx
−1;
pk = (g,X), sk = x;
(M0,M1)← A
H(·),Dsk(·)(pk), |M0| = |M1| = l(K);
β ←R {0, 1}, y←R RBr, Y = ygy
−1, Z = yXy−1, k = H(Z), C∗ = (Y,Ek(Mβ);
β′ ← AH(·),Dsk,6=C∗ (pk, C∗);
If β′ = β, return 1;
else return 0.
Dsk, 6=C∗ means A can not query C
∗ to the oracle. The advantage of A can
be define as a function of the security parameter K
Adv3A(K) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[Exp3A(K) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣
B gets (g,X, cˆ1), cˆ1 is the first component of the target ciphertext. Using the
A attack algorithm 3 as a subprogram, The following steps are taken to calculate
yˆ, cˆ1 = yˆgyˆ
−1.
1. One chooses a random string hˆ←R {0, 1}
l(k) as a guessing value for H(Zˆ),
B don’t know the Zˆ, sents pk = (g,X) to A;
2. H queries (Bounded polynomial times): B build the list H list , element
type is (y, c1, h), initial value is (∗, cˆ1, hˆ), ∗ means unknow in this section. A
can query H list any time, B respond as follows:(assume A query y, B compute
c1 = ygy
−1)
• If (y, c1, h) in H
list, respond with h.
• If (∗, c1, h) in H
list, respond with h, Replacing (∗, c1, h) with (y, c1, h) in
H list.
• Else, choose random string h ←R {0, 1}
l(k), h response, save the (y, c1, h)
into H list.
3. Decryption inquiries. A queries (c1, c2) to B, B responds as follows:
If there is one item (y, c1, h or ∗, c1, h in the table, Dh(c2) response, else,
choose a random string h ←R {0, 1}
l(K), Dh(c2) response, save ∗, c1, h into
H list.
4. Challenge. A outputs two messages M0,M1, B chooses β ←R {0, 1}, sets
cˆ2 = Ehˆ(Mβ), sends (cˆ1, cˆ2) (as the target ciphertext) to A;
5. A execution step 2, but he can’t query (cˆ1, cˆ2).
6. Guess. A outputs β′, B check the H list, if exist one item yˆ, cˆ1, hˆ, then
output yˆ.
Assume that the event D: In the simulation, H(Zˆ) appears in the list H list.
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Assertion 1 B is complete in above simulation process.
proof : It is easy to know:
• In the H inquiry of A, each value is answered by random string.
In the real attack of A, the value of the function is generated by the random
oracle, so the function value obtained by the A is uniformly distributed;
• According to the structure of H list, h = H(y), c1 = ygy
−1, so the decryp-
tion response of B is valid.
Thus, both of the view of A and its view in real attacks are not distinguishable
in calculation.
Assertion 2 In the simulation attacks above, Pr[D] ≥ 2ε
proof If H(Zˆ) does not appear in H list, then A have no hˆ, because of cˆ2 =
E
hˆ
(Mβ) and E’s security, then Pr[β
′ = β|¬D] = 12 . The rest is the same as
Theorem 3.
In summary, if A can take advantage of a non negligible advantage ε(K) win
the IND-CCA2 game, then H(Zˆ) appears at least in the probability of 2ε(K)
in the H list in above simulation process, B check the elements in H list one by
one in step6. So the probability of the success of the adversary B is equal to the
event D, thus, B attacks the CCS assumption with the non negligible advantage
of 2ε(K) . The algorithm 3 is secure against IND − CCA2.
Note that In this algorithm, we assume that the symmetric algorithm is IND-
CCA2, because its construction method is already very mature.[17][35][40][41]
5 Conclusion
For the first time, this paper uses a random oracle model to prove that the Ko
cryptosystem[1] is IND-CPA security and gives a non-hash public key cryptosys-
tem on braid group, which is very similar to the ElGamal system[34]. Finally,
we propose an algorithm on braid group which is secure against chosen of ci-
phertext attack. This is a mixed encryption algorithm[17]. The keys of the sym-
metric encryption part is produced by a random oracle. This design gets rid of
the bondage of the braid group, and making the algorithm more compatible and
more practical.
This paper opens the door of the research on the security of the braid cryp-
tosystem, fills the blank of the research direction of provably security in braid
cryptosystem, to effectively promote the algorithm to engineering applications,
to a certain extent, this article has a pioneering spirit.
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